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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
PAUL DAVID VAN DYKE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15687 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, PAUL DAVID VAN DYKE, appeals from a conviction 
of Aggravated Robbery in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, PAUL DAVID VAN DYKE, was charged with 
Aggravated Robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 
as amended). On January 18, 1977, appellant was found guilty as 
charged. The appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 
the indeterminate term of five years to life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judgment 
rendered by the court below and a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 8, 1977, at approximately 11:20 p.m. the Villa 
Theatre, located at 3092 Highland Drive, Salt Lake County was robbed 
by a man wearing a dark ski mask and carrying an automatic weapon. 
Mr. Terry N. Eckberg, an employee, was working that night in the box 
s 
d 
w 
t: 
office. Upon hearing a loud noice, Mr. Eckberg was confronted by d 
a man wearing a dark mask and carrying what looked like an automatic a 
weapon. The man directed Mr. Eckberg to open the safe and give him w1 
the money (T. 34, 35, 36). i1 
The robber was behind Mr. Eckberg during the opening of w< 
the safe (T. 37). When the safe was opened the contents were placed p< 
in a drawstring laundry bag which had been thrown at Mr. Eckberg by tc 
what appeared to be another robber (T. 37). 
Mr. Eckberg was then told to get in a closet in the office pe 
and the robber left. The entire incident took approximately ten 
minutes (T. 39). or 
Two patrons at a lounge next door to the Villa Theatre were or 
walking towards their car and noticed, at approximately ll: 25 to ll :3 in 
a man come out of the Villa Theatre with a ski mask on (T. 49). As 
the car drove off one of the patrons ran to get the license plate tr 
number of the vehicle and shouted back to the other, "RJD_58." The Ag 
description of the vehicle given by the patrons was a red car sedan 
(T. 50). Jo 
At approximately 11:52 p.m. Detective James Lewis of the Da 
- 2 -
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Salt Lake City Police Department was staking out a white single 
dwelling house with an attached garage. The address of the home 
was 232 East 200 South, Bountiful, Utah (T. 152). 
Officer Lewis observed a red Oldsmobile Cutlass pull into 
the driveway. The license number on the vehicle was RJD458. The 
driver got out of the car and went into the house. A moment later 
a Toyota pulled in and parked behind the Cutlass. Both vehicles 
were then moved into the garage. The driver of the Cutlass was later 
identified by Officer Lewis as Randy Reid. The driver of the Toyota 
was subsequently identified by Officer Lewis as Kirt Moyes. The 
d passenger in the Toyota was subsequently identified by Officer Lewis 
to be the appellant (T. 154, 155, 156). 
During his surveillance Officer Lewis observed four other 
:e people arrive and leave the house (T. 159). 
At 4:20a.m. October 9, 1977, a search warrant was served 
on the residence at 232 East 200 South, Bountiful. After knocking 
~re on the door three or four times, according to the police officers 
L:J involved, no one answered so the door was kicked in (T. 11, 12). 
The entire home was searched, the appellant was arrested, 
tried to a jury and convicted as charged in the Information of 
he A~ravated Robbery. 
n The aforementioned search warrant was issued by Judge 
John Stewart, who is a Justice of the Peace for the precinct in 
Davis County, Utah (T. 7). 
- 3 -
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AF.GUMENT 
POINT I 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW DEMANDS THAT ~ffiEN CITIZENS' HOMES 
ARE SEARCHED AND SEIZED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT 
THE WARRANT MUST BE ISSUED BY A LAW-TRAINED JUDGE. 
Due Process of Law pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process 
Clause, of the United States Constitution, provides that no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law. Essential to the protection of citizens' liberty is the 
right to be tried by a law-trained judge. 
In 1976 the Utah Legislature passed the statutory right 
for all citizens to be accorded the right to be tried by a member of 
the Utah State Bar, Utah Code Ann. §78-5-4 (1953). 
The Legislature's intent enacting §78-5-4, supra, and per-
tinent provision follows: 
(2) Notwithstanding any provision of this code 
relating to jurisdiction on venue of justice courts, 
in any matter in which the judge has the option of 
imposing a jail sentence, the defendant may demand 
and shall be accorded the right to have the case 
tried before a judge who is a member of the Utah 
State Bar . 
The limited authority delegated to justices of the peace 
is further apparent with respect to issuance of a warrant of arrest. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-12-1 (1953) provides in part: 
- 4 -
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A warrant for arrest involves fine legal elements analogous 
to a search warrant. The limiting language of §77-12-1, supra, further 
emphasizes the legislature's apprehensions with respect to non-law-
trained individuals determining the sufficiency of those legal elements 
necessary to warrant the intrusion of one's liberty or security. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-4 (1953) protects citizen's liberty 
from non-legal, untrained individuals, mostly from rural areas who 
are accustomed and authorized to handle only minor law enforcement 
cases. 
In Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 210, 211 (1976) the 
Supreme Court of Utah succinctly stated why the founding fathers 
created the justice of the peace system: 
. . . they created the system in the realization of 
the necessity and desirability of providing a 
realistic and expeditious means for law enforcement 
. . . It seems to be a sound observation that our 
justice of the peace system has and continues to 
serve a useful purpose by providing a readily 
accessible and expeditious means of handling of 
minor ~· (Emphasis Supplied) 
In the case at bar, although immediate deprivation of liberty 
- 5 -
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did not occur, a citizen's home was searched and seized pursuant to b 
the expeditious issuance of a search warrant by a justice of the peac b 
The justice was unable to understand all the intricate legal elements a 
involved in this instance or any lawsuit other than minor offenses. 
For example, in the instant case the search warrant con-
tained a form provision for a nighttime search, absolutely no reason 
or explanation were given for the nighttime search (T. 8, 9, 10). b 
If a search warrant is to be executed during the nighttime, 
the affidavits upon which the warrant is based must be positive that 
the property to be seized is on the person or in the place to be 
searched as provided by Utah Code Ann. §78-54-11 (1953 as amended). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 160, 
499 P.2d 846 (1972) construed Utah Code Ann. §77-54-11 (1953 as 
amended) and stated: 
. . . to satisfy the statute the supporting facts 
in the affidavit must show positively that the 
property is in the place to be searched. 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
The affidavit in the instant case did not so indicate lending further E 
credence to appellant's claim that a non law-trained individual such 
as a justice of the peace is incapable of understanding the intricate 
legal protections developed through case law and legislative mandate, 
as stated, supra, to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures 
- 6 -
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by police officers pursuant to a warrant, requires that the warrant 
be issued by a law-trained judge, who is capable of understanding 
s all the intricate, legal arguments involved. The appellant thus 
argues that any evidence seized pursuant to the improper seach warrant 
should have been suppressed. 
All products of this unconstitutional search should have 
been excluded. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COHMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ALLOWING 
THE STATE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS BY 
THE DEFENDANT. 
Evidence of crimes other than the one alleged in the 
Information cannot be admitted to convict an accused of the crime 
charged in the Information or indictment. State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 
2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969); State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 
P.2d 412 (1961). 
On direct examination of Randy Earl Reid the prosecutor 
elicited statements that connected the appellant with other bad acts 
and statements that disparaged the appellant's character (T. 69). 
e At no time did the appellant introduce any evidence about his character. 
On direct examination of Reid by the prosecutor, the 
following exchange took place: 
Q. Did he mention the Villa Theatre in general 
or specific terms on that occasion? 
A. There was a general term. 
- 7 -
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Q. What was it that he generally mentioned 
about the Villa Theatre on that occasion? 
A. There was a possibility they were going to 
have to go and find some place that was bigger, 
that brought in more money because they had been 
hitting a few rinky-dink places. 
Counsel for the appellant moved for a mistrial out of the 
presence of the jury (T. 70,71,72 and 73). The motion was denied 
(T. 73). 
Later on direct examination of Maria Newman, by the prosecu·, 
tor, the following exchange took place: 
Q. Anything else mentioned about him going to 
work on that evening? 
A. Not that I can remember. 
Q. When you went to the grocery store, who paid 
for the groceries? 
A. Paul. 
Q. And did you see or were you able to see how 
he paid for them? 
A. Cash. 
Q. And did you see any money that he had on him 
at that crime? 
A. I wasn't lookin'. 
Q. Now, in all the times that you've known Mr. 
Van Dyke, have you ever known him to have a job? 
MR. KELLER: Objection. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. KELLER: May we approach the bench? 
- 8 -
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Whereby the objection was sustained, the answer stricken 
and the jury instructed to disregard the last answer of the witness 
(T. 172). 
With respect to the first statement about the appellant 
hitting a "few rinky-dink places" (T. 69), such testimony can be 
admissible only if it tends to prove one of the material issues before 
the court. State v. Mantayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 419 P.2d 958 (1966). 
Under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of 
other crimes or civil wrongs is inadmissible unless it fits within 
one of the exceptions to that rule. Subject to Rules 45 and 48 such 
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material 
fact including absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. 
In the instant case the elicited testimony implicates the 
appellant with other crimes. It shows that the appellant was 
allegedly violating the law allowing the jury to infer on the basis 
of the appellant's bad character that he committed the robbery in the 
case at hand. 
With respect to the second elicitation, the court did in 
fact instruct the jury to disregard the remark. Nevertheless the 
jury did hear the remark and its resulting effect on the jury was to 
substantially prejudice the right of the appellant to a fair trial. 
Under Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, it states: 
Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of a person's 
character is relevant as tending to prove his 
- 9 -
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In the case at bar, when said testimony was elicited, the 
appellant had not introduced any evidence of his good character (T. 1·. 
172). Under Rule 47 evidence of his bad character is clearly inad-
missible at this point and violated the appellant's right to a fair 
trial. The fact that appellant was not employed during this period 
of time, or in fact was ever employed, is clearly a character trait 
which the State intended to use to prove appellant's guilt of the 
offense charged. Furthermore the State tended to show appellant's 
propensity to commit a robbery due to appellant's unemployed character 
trait. 
In a most recent decision this court remanded for a new 
trial a case where the implications of a witness' testimony were an 
attempt to demonstrate defendant's propensity to commit crimes of the 
nature he was presently charged with, State v. Goodliffe, P.2d 
(Utah No. 15363, 1978). The court stated: 
Bare, u.."lproven allegations or "complaints" of prior 
incidents of similar conduct have no relevancy to 
the issue of defendant's truthfulness or veracity. 
The admission of such evidence without further 
- 10 -
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This court has ruled that a mistrial be granted when the 
prosecutor intentionally elicits inadmissible statements from a 
witness. State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P.2d 112 (1941); State 
v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955); and State v. Case, 
l· 547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976). 
In the instant case out of the presence of the jury defense 
counsel's motion for a mistrial was heard and denied (T. 188, 189, 
190, 191). 
The prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value 
and the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial. The jury was 
made aware of the fact that prior crimes and bad character traits 
er may have been committed by appellant. The prejudice which accompanied 
this knowledge could not be diminished by the instruction by the 
judge to disregard the remarks. 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, the appellant respectfully 
submits the lower court erred in admitting certain evidence and 
allowing testimony as to prior bad acts and character traits. The 
result of such error has been to prejudice the right of the appellant 
to a fair trial. Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment 
- 11 -
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and sentence of the court below be reversed and the case be 
remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANDREW A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 12 -
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